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20 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
ber of instances, proof by the plaintiff of negligence on the part of
the defendant, is impossible, either because defendant was not negli-
gent at all, or because plaintiff was unable at the time to secure the
necessary evidence; or lastly, because the injury arose from a mere
accident. Hence, it has been suggested that the state compel com-
pulsory compensation or payment in all cases where automobiles
have caused injury or death, even in cases where no negligence is
provable against the operator of the vehicle, but of course exempt-
ing from liability where the injured person has been guilty of con-
tributory negligence or wanton carelessness.15 The argument is that
under similar facts the principle of workmen's compensation laws
arose between employer and employee; and various phases of their
constitutionality have been passed upon, thus strongly intrenching
the idea as a legal institution.18 The objection to this proposal is
analogous to that advanced against the permission by common car-
riers to insure goods against negligent destruction, that automobile
owners will be all the more careless."7 It would seem, however, that
this objection is without serious weight; it has not worked such
results generally in workmen's compensation, or in operation of
railways; furthermore, the deterring effect of criminal penalties
would likewise seem to offset it. Higher premium rates charged to
policy holders, owners of automobiles, in case of repeated infliction
of injuries, would also have a deterring effect against carelessness.' 8
On the whole, it may be said that while the Massachusetts stat-
utes, thus sustained by the two advisory opinions under discussion,
represent a commendable step forward in solving the problem of
pecuniary relief to pedestrians or users of public highways through
negligent operation of automobiles, they do not go far enough, and
it is likely that the future will see the introduction of the compulsory
compensation principle, where defendant has not been tortiously
negligent. E. F. ALiERTSWORTH.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FOREIGN DECREE AGAINST SUING-REs
JUDICATA.- [Illinois] The question of how far the decree of one
court is conclusive in the court of another state between the same
parties or those in privity with them is a comparatively recent one,
all the aspects of which cannot yet be regarded as definitely estab-
lished.
15. Marx "Compulsory Automobile Insurance" Columbia L. Rev. 25:
164, Amer. Bar Assn. Journ. 11:731.
16. I have collected the various decisions construing workmen's com-
pensation statutes as constitutional in my Syllabus, "The Law of Industrial
Injuries" (1925 Northwestern Univ. Press) pp. 5-6; see also Chamberlain
"Automobiles and Vicarious Liability" Amer. Bar Assn. Journ. 10:788.
17. Supra note 15. See also Ives "Compulsory Liability Insurance"
Amer. Bar Assn. Journ. 10:697, replying to Marx "The Curse of the Per-
sonal Injury Suit" Amer. Bar Assn. Journ. 10:493.
18. Chamberlain "Compulsory Insurance of Automobiles" Amer. Bar
Assn. Journ. 12:49.
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
A recent decision of the Appellate court for the First district
raises one aspect of this problem. In that case one Adeline Allen,
a citizen of Iowa, there began an action at law for personal injuries
against the Chicago, Great Western R. R. Co. While this action
was pending, she began another action for the same tort in the
Superior Court of Cook County. Thereupon the railroad company
procured an injunction from the Iowa court restraining Allen from
prosecuting the Illinois action. The railroad company then filed a
motion in the Illinois court for a continuance, setting up the Iowa
decree. The motion was overruled and the case tried, resulting in a
verdict for Allen. Held by the Appellate Court, that the trial judge
erred in denying the motion for a continuance based on the Iowa
injunction.
There are obviously two different questions suggested here; one,
when will a court issue an injunction affecting the maintenance of an
action in another state ;2 second, what effect will be given to such an
injunction in the second state?
So far as the issuance of decrees against the maintenance of ac-
tions in other states is concerned, there are numerous cases in
which courts have issued injunctions of this kind. One common case
is that of receivership proceedings or proceedings under a state
bankruptcy statute. Courts in which such proceedings are pending
have frequently issued injunctions either against certain particular
creditors or blanket injunctions against all creditors, forbidding them
from beginning or from continuing garnishment or attachment pro-
ceedings in another state directed against the debtor whose estate
was in process of being administered. 8
Aside from these cases there are also other instances in which
injunctions have been granted against beginning or continuing ac-
tions in the courts of another state.4
The cases are even more numerous in which courts have re-
fused to enjoin the bringing of actions in a foreign court, but these
refusals have been rested, not on the ground of a lack of jurisdic-
tion, but upon the ground that the right of a person to litigate his
cause of action before any competent tribunal should not be inter-
fered with, except in cases where the peculiar facts justified the
issuance of the injunction. 5 There is of course no conflict between
these two groups of cases, the question of jurisdiction is one thing,
and the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or refusing the
injunction is a different one.
1. Allen v. Chicago Great Western R. R. Co. (1925) 239 Ill. App. 38.
2. Compare IL. LAw REv. 20:594.
3. Sercomb v. Catlin (1889) 128 IIl. 556; Dehon v. Foster (1862) 4 All.
(Mass.) 545; Chafee v. Quidnick Co. (1881) 13 R. I. 442; Cole v. Cunning-
ham (1889) 133 U. S. 107.
4. Allen v. Buchanan (1893) 97 Ala. 399; Hagar v. Adams (1886) 70
Iowa 746.
5. Folkes v. R. R. (1918) 202 Ala. 376; Ill. Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss
(1917) 277 II. 387; Jones v. Hughes (1912) 156 Ia. 684; Guggenheim v. Wahl(1911) 203 N. Y. 390.
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Assuming that such a decree is issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction, to what extent will it be recognized and enforced by
courts of another state in an action between the same parties or
their privies ?6
So far as the bankruptcy and receivership cases go, certain dis-
tinctions must be rather carefully noticed. In a large part of the
cases in which the question has arisen in the second state as to. what
value should be given to the proceedings in the first state, the con-
tention of the assignee in bankruptcy or the receiver has been that
as a result of the proceedings in the first state he was vested with
the title to the property in the second state. This title he was at-
tempting to assert as against an attaching creditor either of the first
state or of the second state or of some third state. The various
courts have settled the question in different ways, according as the
conveyance was or was not voluntary or as the creditor was or was
was of the same state as the receiver or assignee.7 In such cases
the fundamental conflict of law question involved is that of Prop-
erty, not of res judicata or jurisdiction of the courts, and conse-
quently decisions in such cases that the courts do or do not recog-
nize the title of the receiver or assignee, have no bearing upon the
subject under discussion here. In several of the cases, however, in
which the rights of the assignee or receiver have been sustained as
against the creditor the courts have rested their decision, at least in
part upon the ground that an injunction had been issued which they
would recognize and enforce as against creditors subject to the juris-
diction of the court which issued it, and to that extent they are in
point and tend to sustain the decision of the Appellate court in the
present case.8
Aside from the cases last referred to the decisions recognizing
and enforcing foreign equitable decrees enjoining litigation are very
few. In Dobson v. Pearce9 the New York Court gave effect to a
Connecticut decree enjoining the collection of a New York judg-
6. It is interesting, parenthetically, to notice the development of the law
relating to the enforcement of foreign decrees for the payment of a fixed
sum. In Carpenter v. Thorton (1819) 3 B. & Ald. 52, the court of King's
Bench refused to allow an action at law to be brought upon a decree of the
vice chancellor for the payment of a sum certain, on the ground that such a
decree created no legal obligation. Less than ten years later, in Henley v.
Soper (1828) 8 B. & C. 16, the same court allowed an action upon a decree
of a Newfoundland court of equity for the payment of a fixed sum. That
an action at law can be brought upon a decree of a foreign court for the
payment of a fixed amount is now definitely established: Post v. Neafie
(1805) 3 Caines (N. Y.) 22; Warren v. McCarthy (1860) 25 Ill. 83; Pen-
nington v. Gibson (1853) 16 How. (57 U. S.) 65. In Barber v. Barber (1858)
21 How. (62 U. S.) 582, a bill in equity was allowed for the same purpose.
See also Wagener v. Wagener (1904) 26 R. I. 27.
7. See, for example, the following Illinois decisions: Rhawn v. Pearce
(1884) 110 I11. 350; Townsend v. Coxe (1894) 151 Ill. 62; 1. Walter Thomp-
son Co. v. Whitehead (1900) 185 Ill. 454; Ill. Savings Bank v. Northern
Bank (1920) 292 Ill. 11.
8. Bagby v. R. R. (1878) 86 Pa. 291; Gilman v. Ketcham (1893) 84
Wis. 60. Compare Schindelholz v. Cullum (1893) 55 Fed. 885.
9. (1854) 12 N. Y. 156.
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
ment obtained by fraud. In Fisher v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co."°
a plea in abatement to an action brought in Mississippi upon an
insurance policy was sustained upon proof of an injunction issued
by a Tennessee court enjoining the plaintiff from suing upon the
policy outside of Tennessee.
It may be objected that in these two last mentioned cases the
decree of the court was final whereas in the present case the decree.
was still subject to be modified by the court. An interlocutory de-
cree will not be enforced in another state' and does not come within
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.12  But the fact
that a decree is made expressly subject to the control of the court
that issued it and may be modified on proper showing does not
render it any the less a final decree so long as it stands.13
It is believed that Dobson v. Pearce" and Fisher v. Insurance
Co."8 and the language of the court in Gilman v. Ketchai' 6 sustain
the conclusion of the Appellate court in the case at hand and that
they are in accord with one another and with an established prin-
ciple of the common law rules of conflict of laws. This general
principle is that once a right has been created by a law competent
to do so, that right will be recognized and enforced by other juris-
dictions unless so to do would violate some definitely established
and fundamental policy of the law of the second state.17 The mere
fact that the right would not have come into being in the second
state on the given facts does not in itself show any such fundamental
policy against the right as to prevent its enforcement once it has
been established that it was duly created. In the present case, the
Iowa court by its decree created the duty on the part of the plain-
tiff in the Illinois action to refrain from the further prosecution of
it. That duty once being properly established will be enforced by
Illinois unless it is opposed to some fundamental policy of the state
and there was no showing of any such policy.
One other question is suggested by the case though not dis-
cussed by the court. If the foregoing propositions are correct the
conflict of law rule of Illinois is that it will recognize and enforce
the duty created by the law of Iowa to refrain from prosecuting the
Illinois action. This is perhaps also a duty imposed upon the Illi-
nois courts by the full faith and credit clause. But the exact method
by which the obligation so created shall be enforced is one that the
Illinois law will settle for itself. Conceivably Allen might have
been allowed to go ahead with the action at law and the railroad
10. (1916) 112 Miss. 30.
11. Baugh v. Baugh (1816) 4 Bibb. (Ky.) 556.
12. Board of Public Works v. Columbia (1873) 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 521.
13. Sistare v. Sistare (1909) 218 U. S. 1.
14. Ante note 9.
15. Ante note 10.
16. Ante note 8.
17. How far even this qualification will hold in the light of the full
faith and credit clause in cases where the right created in the first state takes
the shape of a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be con-
sidered at this time.
20 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
company have been given a cross action for damages suffered by
Allen's violation of the duty to refrain from suing; conceivably the
railroad company might have made the Iowa decree the basis of a
proceeding in equity in :Illinois to enjoin the action at law. Such
methods of enforcing the Iowa-created duty would of course be
clumsy; the obvious and easy way of enforcing it was the one that
the court adopted. But the suggestions will serve to illustrate the
difference between the proposition that Illinois will recognize and
give legal protection to a duly created foreign right, and the prop-
osition that the -method of enforcing that right and the collateral
consequences that flow from its admitted existence need not neces-
sarily be the same as they would be in the state where the right was
created.""
HARRY A. BIGELOW.
WHEN IS A FREEHOLD INVOLVED WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE ILLINOIS PRACTICE AcT?-[Illinois] The disposition of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, to confine the number of cases which
may be taken to that court as a matter of right, to the smallest pos-
sible number' (a disposition which arises out of necessity itself born
of the ever-increasing volume of appellate business), is again mani-
fested in Worsley v. Welch,2 where the court held a table of heir-
ship in the Probate court not to involve a freehold, because such a
table was evidence merely, and not conclusive. In that, it would
seem, the court is but following its earlier decisions, particularly
such as held that a bill to declare an absolute deed a mortgage,s a
bill to redeem from a foreclosure sale,4 a bill to foreclosea and a
proceeding in forcible entry and detainer5 do not involve a freehold.
It is interesting to note that the court has held also, that a
freehold is not involved in a proceeding by a remainderman to
obtain the proceeds of a judicial sale of property which was given
to a minor determinable on the death of the minor under certain
circumstances, because, the court said, the conversion of the real
estate into personalty destroyed the freehold6 and for like reason,
that a proceeding between partners for an accounting, does not in-
18. See Dunlap v. Byers (1896) 110 Mich. 109; Burnley v. Stevenson(1873) 24 0. St. 474; Mallette v. Scheerer (1916) 164 Wis. 415; Fall v.
Eastin (1909) 215 U. S. 1. Compare the language of Allen J. in Dobson v.
Pearce (1854) 12 N. Y. 156. 167.
1. ILL. LAW REV. VIII 176; XIV 223; XV 44; XVII 235; XVII 543;
XIX 670.
2. (1925) 317 Ill. 90.
3. ILL. LAw REv. XVII 235, 236; not even where as incident to the
relief a deed to a third party having notice is set aside: Hajicek v. Goldsby
309 Ill. 373, 374; Hess v. Bartinauer 311 Ill. 191, 192; Powers v. Walrath 311
IlL. 593.
4. IL. LAW REV. XVII 543.
4a. First National Bank v. Huber 309 Ill. 362.
5. ILt. LAW REv. XIV 223; Corwine v. Wigginton 290 Ill. 322.
6. Stafford v. Phelps 290 Ill. 559; Wolford v. Young 300 IIl. 322; (any
equitable conversion seems to have that effect) Mills v. Sawyer 302 Ill. 510.
